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The American law of search and seizure and the
enforcement of constitutional rights of privacy
constitute a prime instance of law under stress.
If, as we are told, hard cases make bad law, one
would expect much bad law in the search and
seizure area; for the cases are often hard, indeed.
They are hard both because they place in sharp
conflict interests of great and of the most obvious
.importance and because of confusion and inade-
quacy in the theory of the "right of privacy."
In looking into the law of search and seizure our
expectations are realized: it is an area in which
bad law abounds. Where else does one find quite
such enthusiastic efforts on the part of courts,
legislatures, and even commentators, to have their
cake and eat it, too? Where else do we find such
fervant attempts to obtain advantage from the
simultaneous acceptance of mutually inconsistent
alternatives? One should not expect that all the
tough and intractable problems in this area will
be resolved by this series of papers. But, one may
properly hope and expect that the following dis-
cussion gives due recognition to one fundamental
proposition. That proposition is this: Any decision
with reference to the exclusionary rule in the
search and seizure cases involves costs. Any dis-
cussion of these issues, if it is to be responsible,
must dearly identify these costs. Any proposals
for legislative or judicial action, if they are to
deserve attention, must be founded on conscien-
tious effort to take these costs into account.
First, what is the exclusionary rule in the search
and seizure cases? There are, of course, many rules
and doctrines, dealing with particular problems,
that result in exclusion of evidence from criminal
trials. The rules relating to the inadmissibility of
"involuntary" confessions provide one example.1
IThe basic confession rule may be supplemented by
by special statutory rules of exclusion. Thus in Illinois
the prosecutor is under obligation to furnish the de-
fendant with a copy of his confession before arraign-
Sometimes a legislature in its wisdom will con-
struct a special rule of exclusion such as the re-
markable and little-noticed provision of the
Illinois statutes that declares inadmissible any
evidence obtained by a private detective in the
employ of a governmental official, when the com-
pensation paid the detective is calalted on any
basis other than the time spent by him in the
investigation.2 We are concerned here, owever,
with the special rule of exclusion recognized in
some American jurisdictions relating to evidence
illegally seized. The rule in its broadest form can
be described rather simply. Upon appropriat
motion by the defendant in a criminal prosecution,
evidence obtained from the defendant in violatim
of his constitutional rights to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures will be suppressed
by order of court. In some jurisdictions the evi-
dence subject to suppression need not be physical
or tangible evidence. Thus, the Illinois case,
People v. Albea,3 held that the testimony of a
prosecution witness, a person discovered by the
police in the course of an unlawful search, should
have been excluded at the criminal trial.4 Moreover,
in some circumstances, evidence other than that
directly obtained through unreasonable search and
seizure may be suppressed. Ever since the decision
of the Silverthorne case 5 by the United States Su-
preme Court it has been understood in the federal
courts, and in at least some of the state courts
ment. The provision is mandatory. Failure of the
prosecution to comply renders the confession inad-
missible. IL. Rxv. STAT. c. 38, §729 (1959).
2ILT. REV. STAT. c. 38, §608a (1959).
32 Ill.2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954).
4 And see Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d
690 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The cases on this and related
points, however, have not often gone so far. For a
recent discussion, see Kamisar, I//egal Searcher awd
Seizures and Contemporaneour Incriminating State-
ments, 1961 U. Ir.. L. FORUM 78.
6 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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recognizing the exclusionary rule,6 that theso-called
"derivative use" of illegally seized evidence may be
denied. Thus, evidence obtained legitimately but
brought to the prosecutor's attention by dues or
leads supplied by illegally seized evidence, may,
upon proper showing, also be suppressed.
The exclusionary rule, as just described, is
subject to certain implicit limitations. These
limitations are important, not only because a
statement of them is necessary to the precise
definition of the rule, but because some com-
mentators regard these limitations as imperiling
the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent to police misconduct There are at least
four such limitations. First, it has been clearly
held in the federal cases that evidence obtained
unlawfully from the defendant by a private person
is not subject to suppression. The theory here is
that the exclusionary rule is designed to enforce
constitutional rights of privacy. The Fourth
Amendment provides an immunity from official
or governmental misconduct, not a protection
against private action, however illegal or even
criminal it may be.
Second, it is generally understood that one
moving to suppress evidence has standing to
complain only of illegal searches which violated
his own constitutional rights.' Thus, a defendant
may not obtain the exclusion of incriminating
evidence illegally seized by the police solely in
£ E.g., People v. Martin, 382 I1. 192, 46 N.E.2d
997 (1943).
7This position has been frequently taken. Typical
expreswos may be found in Grant, Circumventing the
tke Fotk Amexdment, 14 So. CAL F. L. Ruv. 359
(1941); Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and
Seizure, 58 YALE L. J. 144 (1948).
&The leading case is Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465 (1921). See also Gindrat v. People, 138 IJl.
103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891); Siebert v. People, 143 Ill.
571, 32 N.E. 431 (1892); State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348,
377, 259 S.W. 100, 108-09 (1924). But cf. Black,
Burdeau v. McDowell; A Judicial Milepost on the Road
to Absolutism, 12 B.U.L. Rxv. 32 (1932); Chafee, The
Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HARV. L. Rv. 673,
700-703 (1922).
'Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably
Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471 (1952). And
see Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 955 (5th Cir.
1926); Walker v. State, 194 Ind. 402, 142 N.E. 16
(1924); Tongut v. State, 197 Ind. 539, 151 N.E. 427
(1926). Corporate officers are usually held to lack
standing to complain of an unreasonable search and
seizure directed against the corporation: Guckenheimer
and Bros. Co. v. United States, 3 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.
1925); Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.
1926); People v. Perry, 1 Ill.2d 482, 116 N.E.2d 360
(1954). Cf. Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795
(7th Cir. 1920) (same result as to officer of an unin-
corporated association).
violation of a third party's rights of privacy.
Nevertheless, the determination of when a peti-
tioner's rights have been sufficiently affected by
a search or seizure to give him standing to sup-
press the evidence so obtained is one of some
difficulty. The 1951 decision in United States v.
Jeffers indicated that the Supreme Court, at
least, was disposed toward a rather liberal view
of the standing requirements. 0 This impression
is strongly confirmed by the recent decision in
Jones v. United States." The opinion recognizes
the general formula that one having standing to
invoke the exclusionary rule "must have been a
victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the
search was directed."" In Jones the defendant
was accused of a narcotics offense. The apartment
searched and in which the drugs were seized was
leased by a friend who had merely given defendant
permission to make temporary use of the premises.
The Court recognized defendant's substantial
dilemma. If his interest in the apartment was not
sufficient to support a motion to suppress, standing
could only be predicated on his "ownership" of
the drugs seized. But the latter allegation would
go far to establish defendant's guilt of the offense
charged. The Court resolves the dilemma by
finding the defendant's "interest" in the premises
sufficient. The holding is that "anyone legitimately
on the premises where a search occurs may chal-
lenge its legality .by way of motion to suppress,
whqn its fruits are proposed to be used against
him."
A third and much less significant limitation on
the exclusionary rule was delineated by the
Supreme Court in Walder v. United States." In
1950 defendant successfully moved to suppress
the use of a narcotic capsule as evidence which had
been illegally seized from him by federal officers.
Two years later, when defendant was again on
trial on a different narcotics charge, defendant
testified on direct examination that he had never
had narcotics in his possession. The trial judge
permitted the government to impeach defendant's
1"342 U.S. 48 (1951). Narcotics were unlawfully
seized from hotel rooms rented, not by defendant, but
by his aunts. The latter had given him free access to
the rooms. The Court held that defendant had standing
primarily by reason of his "property" interest in the
drugs. Although the drugs were "contraband" they
were to be treated as defendant's property for purposes
of invoking the exclusionary rule.
11362 U.S. 257 (1960).
12 Id. at 261. (Emphasis added.)
s Id. at 267.
14 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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testimony by bringing to the stand one of the
officers who had participated in the earlier illegal
seizure and allowing him to testify that drugs at
that time had been taken from defendant's person.
In affirming the conviction, the Court said: "It
is one thing to say that the Government cannot
make use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is
quite another to say that defendant can turn the
illegal method by which the Government's pos-
session was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradic-
tion of his untruths.""s
A fourth limitation on the exclusionary rule is
the so-called "silver-platter" doctrine. The phrase
is that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter 6 and is descrip-
tive of the holdings in many federal cases, prior
to Elkins v. United States,' that evidence illegally
seized by state officers may be handed over-on
a silver platter-to federal officers and be admitted
in a federal trial, so long as there was no federal
participation in the illegal activities of the state
police.18 But in the 1960 decision of Elkins a
majority of the Supreme Court concluded that
"this doctrine can no longer be accepted." 9 The
result, according to the Court's opinion, was
induced by the "logic" of the holding in Wolf v.
Colorado, decided eleven years earlier.20 The
Wolf case established the proposition that rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures by
state officers are included among the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, the
holding in Elkins appears directly predicated, not
on a constitutional ground, but on the Court's
supervisory powers over federal criminal justice.
The test to determine whether evidence illegally
seized by state authority is to be suppressed in a
federal trial is stated as follows: ". . . evidence
obtained by state officers during a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have vio-
ls Id. at 65.
16 See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79
(1949).
17 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
I The leading case in this series is Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). For a state case dealing
with the same problem, see People v. Touhy, 361 Ill.
332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935). Consult the interesting and
important discussion, Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten
Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MiNN. L. Rav. 1083 (1959). As might be
expected, the questions of what constituted federal
"participation" and what quantum of evidence is
necessary to establish it proved difficult and vexing.
19 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960)..
20 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Consult, Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties,
45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).
lated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment
is inadmissible over the defendant's timely objec-
tion in a federal criminal trial.'"2 The complexities
inherent in the Elkins rule cannot adequately be
canvassed in a single paragraph; but that there
are unanswered questions seems apparent. Thus
the majority opinion seems tacitly to assume that
the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment
against federal action are in all respects the same
as those against unreasonable search and seizure
by state officials implicit in the Fourteenth. If,
as one might have supposedn the protections of
the Fourth Amendment are broader, then the
federal courts may be required to exclude evidence
from the federal trial which was obtained by state
officers without violation of defendant's federal
constitutional rights. On the other hand, if the
Fourth Amendment rights are defined more
narrowly than those recognized under state con-
stitutional or statutory provisions, the federal
court may be authorized to admit evidence which
would have been barred by a state court recogniz-
ing the exclusionary rule. Moreover, there is
another side to the platter: What about the obliga-
tions of state courts with reference to evidence
seized unlawfully by federal officials? Given the
conclusion in Wolf that states are not required to
adopt the exclusionary rule, it must surely follow
that a state need not suppress evidence illegally
-seizedby federal officials when it is free to admit
evidence illegally seized by its own officers. Never-
theless, a number of states prior to Elkins had
already ruled as a matter of local law, that evidence
illegally seized by federal officers should be barred
from state proceedings0 The Elkins ruling may
induce other state courts to adopt a similar posi-
tion. It should also be recalled that in Rea v.
United States the Court approved an injunction
restraining a federal officer from testifying in a
state proceeding as to matters discovered in the
course of executing an invalid federal search
warrant2 4 For the purposes at hand it must suffice
to say that many problems in this area are yet
21364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
21 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in the Elkins case, id. at 237 el seq. Cf. Kamisar,
op. cit. supra note 18.
2The authoriies are collected in Grant, The Tar-
nished Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of
Illegally Seized Evidence, 8 UCLA L. REv. 1, 28,
n. 144 (1961).
2 350 U.S. 214 (1956). And see Wilson v. Schnettler,
365 U.S. 381 (1961).
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to be resolved and much remains to be considered
in the years ahead.
These, then, are the major limitations on the
scope of the exclusionary rule in the search and
seizure cases. They do not, however, exhaust the
list, for various local doctrines constricting the
application of the rule have emerged. Some of these
will be noted in connection with the discussion of
other matters to which I now must turn.
A word needs to be said about what might be
called the procedure of the exclusionary rule. There
are variations from one jurisdiction to another
in these matters. But the situation in general can
be simply stated. In most jurisdictions recogniking
the rule, the issue of illegal search must be raised
in a pre-trial motion to suppress, unless the facts
supporting the motion did not come to the atten-
tion of the defendant or could not reasonably have
been discovered by him until after commence-
ment of the trial. 5 Many cases hold that if the
motion to suppress is denied, the issue of unreason-
able search can be preserved for appeal only by
defense counsel's making appropriate objection
at the trial when the contested evidence is offered
by the prosecution. 6 One further procedural
matter deserves attention. In many jurisdictions,
if a motion to suppress is granted, there may
often be no way for the prosecution to challenge
the trial judge's ruling that the evidence was
21 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 337 Ill. 310, 328,
169 N.E. 243 (1929) ("Where it is claimed that evidence
against one accused of crime has been obtained by an
unlawful search of his house and seizure of his effects,
the question of such unlawful search and seizure must
be presented to the court before the trial, if possible.
If the accused has not raised the question before the
trial he cannot avail himself of it when the evidence is
offered on the trial."); State v. Gillam, 230 Iowa 1287,
300 N.W. 567 (1942); Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770,
114 So. 534 (1927). And see FED. R. Casx. P. 41(e):
"The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless
opportunity therefore did not exist or the defendant
was not aware of the grounds for the motion at the
trial or hearing." But some courts have ruled to the
contrary: Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152,
169, 224 S.W. 860 (1920) ("In our practice the proper
time, and the only time, in which objection can be
made to the introduction of evidence by the mouth of
witnesses is when it is offered during the trial .... ");
Shuck v. State, 223 Ind. 155, 59 N.E.2d 124 (1945).
The burden of proof in the hearing to suppress is
ordinarily held to be on the moving party, Mata v.
State, 203 Ind. 291, 179 N.E. 916 (1932). In one case
in which the motion to suppress was made at the trial,
the appellate court ruled that the hearing conducted
in the presence of the jury did not constitute reversible
error but was a matter within the trial judge's discre-
tion. Italiano v. State, 141 Fla. 249, 193 So. 48 (1940).
26 People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421, 168 N.E. 344 (1929);
Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770, 114 So. 534 (1927);
Wishmire v. State, 196 Ind. 104, 147 N.E. 278 (1925).
obtained by or derived from an unconstitutional
search and seizure. Quite generally, a ruling on
the motion to suppress is not itself appealable
because it is not regarded as a "final order" or
for some other reason.u On the other hand, if the
motion is granted and the evidence suppressed, the
prosecution may have no case, with the result
that the charge must be dismissed or the defendant
acquitted. If the defendant is acquitted, the
prosecution, of course, is barred from access to the
appellate court by appeal. The serious consequence
of this situation is that, particularly in areas of
criminal litigation such as gambling, where motions
to suppress are frequently filed and frequently
granteds the decisions of trial judges are sub-
stantially immune from effective appellate super-
vision. There is reason to believe that the search
and seizure law being applied in inferior trial
courts sometimes bears only coincidental relation
to the principles announced in decisions of the
highest court of the jurisdiction.
If the foregoing will suffice as a brief sketch of
the nature of the exclusionary rule and its mode
of application, we may now direct our attention
to other questions. What is the historical and legal
basis of the exclusionary rule?
There is a notion-I am almost tempted to call
it a myth-that the exclusionary rule in the search
and seizure cases is merely the illegitimate progeny
of the American prohibition experiment. The rule,
according td this version of its history, was con-
ceived in sin, for it represented little more than
an elaborate effort at judicial nullification by
judges hostile to the enforcement of the Eighteenth
Amendment. This explanation of the exclusionary
rule is vulnerable on two scores. First, it is probably
not true or, at least, it contains only a partial
truth. Second, acceptance of any such notion as
the sole or primary explanation for the creation
and survival of the exclusionary rule requires one
to ignore or trivialize persisting and pressing issues
in the current administration of criminal justice.
Certainly, in the federal courts, the origins of the
exclusionary rule long antedated national prohibi-
tion. Boyd v. United States" and Weeks v. United
v Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929).
But cf. United States v. Sineiro, 190 F.2d 397 (3d
Cir. 1951).
28 See the instructive data presented in Comment,
Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Con-
stitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. RaV. 493
(1952)."116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Slates-° were decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1886 aaid 1914, respectively.
Neither involved the enforcement of liquor laws.
As late as 1955, long after the Noble Experiment
had become only a quaint historical memory, the
California court in People v. Cahan3' overturned
its long-established law and adopted the exclusion-
ary rule. To be sure, most of the states that
accepted the "Weeks Rule" did so in the period
of national prohibition., No doubt, in some cases,
the adoption or rejection of the exclusionary rule
reflected the attitude of particular judges toward
the whole prohibition enterprise. But it should
also be noticed that the prohibition laws provided
many state courts with their first occasions to
give serious consideration to the problem of en-
forcement of individual rights against unreasonable
search and seizure. When national prohibition
suddenly burst upon the country the jurisprudence
of many states was almost completely innocent of
authoritative precedents, not only as to ways and
means of enforcement, but as to substance of
these rights in the multitude of situations then
being presented for the first time to the courts for
adjudication.n The Volstead Act and supporting
state legislation represented the first important
nation-wide effort to enforce criminal sanctions
against conduct which involves no victims or, at
least those who may be called willing victims.
Such areas of penal regulation present peculiar
problems of enforcement; in such areas the likeli-
hood of violations of constitutional rights of
privacy is greatest.n The prohibition experiment
has, by and large, been abandoned. But efforts at
law enforcement in other areas, presenting com-
parable problems, persist and have become more
important with the passing of the years. Insofar
as the problems we are discussing today are con-
cerned, those associated with the gambling laws
and narcotics enforcement are, after all, not so
30 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3144 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
2 The difficulties associated with the paucity of
settled law are graphically illustrated in an article
written in this period by a Wisconsin prosecutor,
Roberts, Does the Search and Seizure Clause Hinder the
Proper Administration of the Criminal Justice?, 5
Wis. L. Rxv. 195 (1929). At one point he asserts: "It
can probably be safely said that the decisions passing
squarely upon the search and seizure clause of the
Constitutions of the states prior to prohibition would
not average one for each state." Id. at 200.
3 See Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law:
Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Justice, 32 Soc.
Sza. REv. 107, 112 (1958).
very different from those of thirty years ago. It
will not do, therefore, to brush aside the exclusion-
ary rule in the search and seizure cases as an histori-
cal aberration arising out of an effort at penal
regulation, fortunately long since abandoned.
Whatever one's conclusion as to the propriety of
the exclusionary rule, the problems it attempts to
confront are dear and present.
So much for the historical background of the
exclusionary rule. What can be said of its legal or
constitutional basis? It is strange that after the
decision of hundreds of cases by state and federal
courts in which the exclusionary rule has been
applied these questions are still in doubt. From
the decision of the first important case, Boyd v.
United States," the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has played some role in efforts to articulate
the legal basis of the rule. But its role has been
confusing and ill-defined. In Agnello v. United
Stales the Supreme Court announced the stark
proposition: "It is well settled that when properly
invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every
person from incrimination by the use of evidence
obtained through a search or seizure made in
violation of his rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment."30 But by 1949 and the decision of Wolf v.
Colorado,36 a case surely requiring the most precise
articulation of the constitutional basis for the
exclusionary rule, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is almost totally ignored. Mr. Justice Black
describes the rule simply as a rule of evidence
applied by the federal courts. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter sees it as deriving from the Fourth Amend-
ment by "judicial implication." The dissenting
justices treat it as a necessary and inherent part
of the Fourth Amendment's protections.
The reliance on the privilege against self-in-
crimination in these cases, it seems to me, has
contributed neither to clarity nor sense. Certainly,
the reliance on the privilege has not been con-
sistent. Thus, it is generally held that a corporation
may move to suppress evidence illegally seized
from it, despite the fact that corporate bodies are
said to lack capacity to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination.u Reliance on the privilege as
the rationale of the exclusionary rule is also
probably responsible for some egregious decisions
- 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
35 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925).
36 338 U.S. 26 (1949).
1
7 Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920). Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Wattling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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denying the exclusion of evidence in cases in which
the defendant, although the victim of illegal
search, disclaims ownership of the property seized.n
It is dear, as opponents of the rule have fre-
quently pointed out, that the exclusionary rule
in the search and seizure cases is in opposition to
the ordinary assumptions of the Anglo-American
law of evidence which generally, though not
universally, postulates that competent evidence is
not rendered incompetent by virtue of the fact
thdt the evidence was obtained in an improper
or illegal fashion. How has this deviation from
nwmal assumptions been justified by courts
accepting the exclusionary rule? Apart from
reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination,
I find two principal grounds being relied on in the
cases. First, it is said, the exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence is necessary to deter police mis-
conduct and provides an indispensable-device for
enforcement of constitutional rights of privacy.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in
the Wolf case, gives succinct expression to this
view, when he says: [E]vidence obtained [by
unreasonable search and seizure] must be excluded
... , since in the absence of that rule of evidence
the Amendment would have no effective sanc-
tion.'" The second basis of the exclusionary
rule, frequently articulated in state as well as
federal opinions, is essentially an ethical ground.
A typical expression is that of the Florida court
in a case decided almost forty years ago: "To
permit an officer of the State to acquire evidence
illegally and in violation of sacred constitutional
guaranties, and to use the illegally acquired evi-
dence in the prosecution of the person who illegally
38Compare People v. Exum, 382 fll. 204, 209, 47
N.E.2d 56 (1943) ("Nowhere in his motion is it alleged
that any of the property seized is claimed to be the
property of the defendant, nor does he claim any
interest in it or ask for its return.... The property
admittedly not belonging to him or being property in
which he has an interest or right of possession, we are
at a loss to see how he can complain whether of its
seizure or its use as being a violation of his constitu-
tional rights. Clearly, if the property is not his and he
has no interest in it, and no right to its possession, he
is not in the position of giving evidence against himself
when it is introduced as exhibits upon the trial.")
swik People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 591-92, 53 N.E.2d
591 (1944) ("If, in order to have them suppressed he
must allege that he owned them, then he has in effect
been compelled to admit the possession of stolen
property recently following a crime, which is sufficient
in itself, unless explained, to authorize conviction.")
See Note, 96 L. Eo. 66 (1951).
39 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949). (Italics in the original.)
acquired the intoxicants strikes at the very founda-
tion of the administration of justice, and where
such practices prevail makes law enforcement a
mockery." 40 Needless to say, the critics of the
exclusionary rule find neither of these grounds
persuasive or sufficient.
Not all of the American states have adopted the
exclusionary rule; indeed, only about half of them
have done so." Twenty of the states appear to
have adopted the rule without substantial qualifi-
cation. These include42 such populous jurisdictions
as California,4  Illinois," Indiana,
45 Missouriy4
Texas,47 and Wisconsin. In Michigan, although
the exclusionary rule was adopted early by the
courts," certain categories of evidence are now
placed outside the operation of the rule by con-
stitutional amendment, including narcotics, fire-
arms and other dangerous weapons seized in
places other than a dwelling house. 0 Alabama,"
40 Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 52, 94 So. 329, 332
(1922). (Italics in the original.)
41 Note, 50 A.L.R.2d 533 (1956). See also the appen-
dix to the opinion of the Court in Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960).
4The jurisdictions not specifically mentioned in the
text include the following: Delaware (Rickards v. State,
45 Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950)); Florida (Atz v.
Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922)); Idaho (State v.
Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927)); Kentucky
(Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W.
860 (1920)); Mississippi (Tucker v. State, 128 Miss.
211, 90 So. 845 (1922)); Montana (State ex rd. King
v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 Pac. 862 (1924));
North Carolina (apparently full adoption of the exclu-
sionary rule by statutory amendment, N.C. GE-N. STAT.
§15-27 (Supp. 1951); Oklahoma (Gore v. State, 24
Okla. Crim. 394, 218 Pac. 545 (1923)); Oregon (State
v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443, 204 Pac. 958, 206 Pac. 290
(1922), and see comment in Kamisar, op. cit. supra
note 18 at 1160, n.259); Rhode Island (R. I. GEN. LAWS
§§9-19-25 (1956). See State v. Hillman, 84 R.I. 396,
125 A.2d 94 (1956)); Tennessee (Hughes v. State, 145
Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (1921)); Washington (State v.
Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922)); West
irginia (State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261
(1922)); Wyoming (State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223,
231 Pac. 683 (1924)).
4People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
" People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
45 Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817
(1922).
4" State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924).
47TEX. CODE CnMM. PRoc. art. 727a (Vernon, 1941).
See Williamson v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 520, 244
S.W.2d 202 (1951).48 Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
49 People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W.
557 (1919).
50 MICH. CONST. 1908, art. II, §10 (as amended in
1934 and 1952).
51 Act of September 12, 1951 (ALA. CODE tit. 29,
§210 (1940)).
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Maryland,n and South Dakotan3 have by legisla-
tion adopted the rule only as to the situations
stipulated in their statutes. Hawaii and Alaska
have apparently not spoken to the question since
becoming states." The federal rule of exclusion
operates in the District of Columbia.55
The division of the American states into exclu-
sion and non-exclusion jurisdictions suggests one
final cluster of problems. These problems can
hardly be more than noted, for they are extremely
complex, involving basic constitutional issues
implicit in a system of federalism. The most
important question can be put in this fashion:
By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment or other
provision of the United States constitution, can
federal power be employed to force upon an un-
willing state court the exclusion of illegally-seized
evidence in a state proceeding? This question
could scarcely have been seriously asked as recently
as a generation ago. But in 1949 the Supreme
Court of the United States decided the case of
Wolf v. Colorado." The opinion of the Court,
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, appears to
announce two propositions. First, individual
immunities from unreasonable search and seizure
by state officials are to be regarded, in the lan-
guage of the traditional due process formula, as
rights "basic to a free society" and, hence, fall
within the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But second, the exclusion of evidence
illegally seized is merely one method of enforce-
ment among many, and the states are free to
accept or reject the exclusionary rule according to
local conceptions of policy. Two years later, the
Court, again through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
emphasized its unwillingness to enforce the exclu-
sion of illegally-seized evidence against the states
when it denied federal injunctive relief to the
defendant in a state proceeding who alleged that
evidence against him had been illegally seized by
"MD. LAWS 1929, c. 194. See Sugarman v. State,
173 Md. 52, 195 At. 324 (1937). See also Salsburg v.
Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
53S. D. CODE §34.1102 (1935) (evidence seized under
color of an invalid search warrant admissible). See
State v. Land, 76 S.D. 544, 82 N.W.2d 286 (1957).
6Prior to statehood courts of both jurisdictions
followed the federal rule. See United States v. Doumain,
7 Alaska 31 (1923), and Territory v. Ho Me, 26 Hawaii
331 (1922), cited in Kamisar, op. cit. supra note 18 at
1160, n. 259.
46 Darall v. United States, 33 A.2d 734 (Mun. Ct.
App., D.C., 1943).
56 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
state officials and that this evidence was to be
introduced in the state trial.Y
What has been the practical impact of the
Wolf case on state criminal procedure? To date
it has not been great. True enough, in Rochin v.
California, the stomach-pump case, a state con-
viction was reversed; but this result was reached
with almost scrupulous avoidance of all talk of
search and seizure and of reliance on the authority
of the Wolf case.W Later, in Irvine v. California,
the case in which state police planted a microphone
in defendant's home, the Court affirmed the con-
viction on the authority of Wolf, although the
majority expressed shock and dismay at the police
practices involved." Interestingly enough, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter dissented vigorously, insisting
that the Wolf precedent required no such result.
However one may feel about the result contended
for in the dissent, it seems fair to suggest, with all
gentleness, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had
become entoiled in a semantic mesh of his own
making. To label a right as one "basic to a free
society" is to say about as much as one can say of
a constitutional protection. The right of petitioner
Wolf had been so labelled; and yet, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter for the Court had ruled in Wolf v.
Colorado that the state need not exclude the
evidence from the criminal trial. But if in Irvine,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter insists, exclusion of the
illegally obtained evidence should be enforced by
federal power, how is defendant's violated right
to be characterized? Is Irvine's right one "very,
very" basic to a free society? 0 The position seems
almost to involve a comparison of superlatives,
which, whatever may be said for its logic, presents
some difficulties of grammar.
The problems of the exclusionary rule in the
area of federal-state relations are many. It is not
possible in the brief compass of this paper to
embark on a full analysis of all of them. For
purposes of illustration, however, one further issue
may be noted. Assume a case arising from a state
that has accepted the exclusionary rule but has
permitted evidence to be admitted on what defen-
dant claims to be an erroneous interpretation of
his constitutional rights of privacy. Under the
Wolf case, may the Supreme Court intervene and
-1 Stefanelli v. Menard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
58 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
59 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
60 These matters have been recently discussed in
Kamisar, op. cit. supra note 18.
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reverse the state conviction? It would certainly
seem that such a result might and, in an
appropriate case, should follow. Yet one of the
Courts of Appeal has reached a contrary decision."
This, then, must serve as the background for
our discussion of the exclusionary rule in the
search and seizure cases. What does forty years
of widespread experience with the rule teach us?
In previous efforts to evaluate this experience
have the right questions been asked? These and
many more difficult problems I happily surrender
- to bolder and more competent hands.
ADDENDUM
One of the hazards of the legal commentator,
especially one who concerns himself with the work
of the United States Supreme Court, is that events
sometimes outrun publishing schedules. Thus the
decision of the Court in Mapp v. Ohio,m announced
on the last day of the 1960 term, requires funda-
mental modifications in the description, given
above, of the American law as it relates to the
exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases. Mapp
holds that the states are now required, by reason
a Sis v. Overlade, 220 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1955).
A 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961), decided on June 19, 1961.
City police acting pursuant to information that a person
involved in a bombing was hiding in petitioner's apart-
ment and that policy paraphernalia was hidden in the
home, requested admission for purposes of earch.
After calling her lawyer, petitioner refused admission
except under the authority of a search warrant. Later
the police returned, broke open the outside door, andgained admission to the apartment armed with a docu-
ment said to be a search warrant. There is reason to
believe that no warrant had in fact issued or that the
police had adequate grounds for issuance of a valid
warrant. Petitioner's request to see the warrant was
refued, and when she snatched the paper from the
officers hands, a scuffle ensued and the paper was re-
trieved. Petitioner was handcuffed and her apartment
and the basement of the building was thoroughly
searched. Petitioner's counsel, who arrived on the
see when the search was in progress, was denied ad-
mission. In the course of the search obscene books and
pict.- were seized. Petitioner, who explained that the
obecs seized were owned by a roomer who had va-
cated the apartment, was convicted of possession of the
obscene materials. The conviction was affirmed by the
Ohio supreme court. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427,
166 N.E.2d 387 (1960). Due to a rule limiting the power
of the Ohio court to invalidate state legislation, the
affirmance occurred despite the fact that a majority of
the state supreme court felt that the statute under
which petitioner was convicted was unconstitutional.
Ohio has refused to adopt the exclusionary rule as a
matter of local law; hence the admission of the fruits of
the unlawful search did not provide grounds for re-
versal.
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to exclude from state criminal trials evidence
seized in violation of the accused's constitutional
rights by state officers. In so doing the Court
specifically overruled its 1949 decision in Wolf v.
Colorado, insofar as that case held the states free to
accept or reject the exclusionary rule as a means to
enforce rights against unreasonable search.w
. That the Court might one day overturn, or at
least substantially modify, its holding in Wolf was
undoubtedly recognized by many who follow the
Court's work. There were several straws in the
wind, such as the tenor of the opinion of the Court
in Elkins v. United States," which suggested that
this might occur sooner rather than later. Never-
theless, that the Court should act when it did and
that it should employ the Mapp case as the vehicle
to effect this change in due process doctrine prob-
ably came as a surprise to most. 65
The brief compass of these remarks does not
make possible a full evaluation of the Court's
action. It must suffice to say that an appraisal of
the Mapp case involves more than a canvassing of
opinions relating to the desirability and .effective-
ness of the exclusionary rule as a device to enforce
constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure. It involves questions of the proper
exercise of judicial power in a federal system. There
will undoubtedly be many who will contend that
the Court has invaded areas of discretion and self-
determination reserved to the states. The con-
troversies on this and other issues are likely to
persist in the years ahead.
It is not possible to anticipate all of the conse-
quences of the Mapp decision, but some can be
stated with reasonable assurance. The immediate
impact of the holding will, of course, be felt most
strongly in those states which have consistently
rejected the exclusionary rule as a matter of local
law.66 Rights to suppress illegally seized evidence
must now be recognized in these jurisdictions.
Mapp also presumably sweeps aside provisions of
3 See discussion in the text at note 56, supra.
64 364 U. S. 206 (1960). An interesting contrast is pro-
vided by comparing the remarks relating to the exclu-
sionary rule in the opinion of the Court in the dkins
case with those of Mr. Justice Jackson in Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128,135,136-37 (1954).
65 Including, presumbably, Mapp's counsel. The de-
cision of Wolf v. California.is not cited in appellant's
brief. See Brief of Appellant on the Merits, No. 236,
October Term, 1960.
"See discussion in the text at note 41, supra.
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state constitutions 67 and statutes6 which give
only a partial recognition to the exclusionary rule.
The statement of certain procedural requirements
relating to the motion to suppress, such as the rule
that the motion must be made before trial,6' will
undoubtedly be left to the law of the states. On the
other hand, one may anticipate that issues of
standing to object to an illegal search and the right
to object to the derivative use of unlawfully ob-
tained evidence will in the main be resolved by
federal law?0 It seems likely, also, that the Su-
preme Court will be called upon to review state
court decisions relating to the validity of searches
and seizures by state officers much more frequently
than in the past. The implicit assumption of the
Elkins case, that the rights against unreasonable
search and seizure protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are in all respects the same as those
protected by the Fourth, may thereby be put to the
test?1 Both state and federal courts will inevitably
be confronted by petitions from state prisoners
alleging that their convictions, prior to Mapp,
are void because based on illegally seized evidence.
61 See note 50, supra.
6
8See notes 51-53, supra.
19 See discussion in the text at note 25, supra.
70 See discussion in the text at note 9, supra.
n See discussion in the text at note 22, supra.
The ramifications of the Mapp decision in other
areas of constitutional adjudication are obviously
more speculative. It is possible, for example, that
the Court may be induced to apply the Fkins
doctrine to the state courts and require the latter
to suppress evidence illegally seized by federal
officers when there has been no participation in the
illegal behavior by state police 2 Mapp may also
induce reconsideration of the Court's interpreta-
tion of Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act,7 3 insofar as it involves the admission of wiretap
evidence in state proceedings. The problem of wire-
tapping, to be sure, involves a federal statute rather
than a constitutional provision and may in other
respects differ from the problem of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nevertheless, the holding in
Schwartz v. Texas7 ' which permitted the states to
admit wiretap evidence in state proceedings, was
based in significant part on the analogous authority
of Wolf v. Colorado. That authority has now been
overturned.
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that by
its decision in Mapp v. Ohio the Court has effected
far-reaching modifications in the American law of
search and seizure. The reverberations of that de-
cision have only just begun.
See discussion in the text at note 23, supra.
7348 Stat. 1064, 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
74 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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